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www.clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmAbstract: 
This paper presents an empirical analysis of commercial bank 
holdings of municipal securities (munis) from June 1985 through 
December 1988,  using the FFIEC's Reports of Condition and Income. 
While motivated by previous analyses suggesting that a shift from 
munis to taxable securities is a primary determinant of the overall 
impact of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 on  bank profitability, this 
paper does not directly analyze the impact of that legislation. 
However, the paper modifies the specification of muni demand 
employed in previous analyses to consider roles for state pledging 
requirements, realization of capital gains or losses, and the 
simultaneous  provision for loan losses.  The results provide some 
support for including state pledging requirements,  realization of 
capital gains and losses,  and the loan loss provisions in analyses 
of  muni holdings. 
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The  Tax  Reform  Act  of  1986  (TRA)  removed  one  of  the primary 
incentives for commercial  banks  to hold municipal  securities by 
increasing to 100 percent  the proportion of  the interest expense 
associated with holding municipal securities that is disallowed as a 
tax deduction.  Until 1982,  Internal Revenue  Code  265,  which 
restricts the deductibility of  interest expense associated with 
tax-exempt securities, was  generally not applicable to the accounts 
incurred by  financial  institutions to depositors. The  Tax  Equity and 
Fiscal Responsibility Act  of  1982 established a  mechanical 
disallowance rule, allocating interest expense  to tax-exempts  in 
proportion to their share in the financial institution's total 
assets.  Initially, the amount  of  the expense  allocated that was 
disallowed was  15 percent,  but that amount  was  increased to 20 
percent  in 1984.  1 
The  extent to which  banks  have  switched from  tax-exempt  to 
taxable securities is a primary  factor in determining the impact 
that TRA  has had on bank  profitability. The  switch to taxable 
securities subject to a  lower  marginal corporate tax rate could 
boost after-tax profits in spite of changes  to the tax code,  such as 
recapture of  loan loss reserves,  that would  tend  to decrease 
after-tax profits.  In fact, at least three studies conducted with 
pre-TEU  data (Neubig and  Sullivan [1987a, 1987b1, O'Brien  and 
Gelfand  [1987]) concluded that TEU  would  improve  bank  after-tax 
profits. 
The  influence of TRA  on  the municipal bond  market has other 
dimensions.  For  esample,  much  research on  the municipal bond  market 
www.clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmhas focused on  the issue of  whether banks  are (or have  ever been) 
the marginal holders of municipal  debt  (for example,  Skelton 
119831).  Even  if selling pressure emanating from commercial hanks 
may  now  influence municipal bond  yields,  there now  seems  to be  a 
consensus  that banks  are not the marginal  investors. 
In this paper,  utilizing balance-sheet data from  the Federal 
Financial Institution Examination  Council's  Reports  of  Condition and 
Income  ("call reports"), we  analyze  the behavior  of  commercial bank 
holdings of municipal debt from June  1985 through December  1988. 
However,  we  do  not directly study the overall impact  of  TRA  on  bank 
profitability or seek to determine whether  banks  are the marginal 
holders of municipal debt.  Rather, we  are interested in analyzing 
the factors determining the portfolio behavior  of  commercial banks. 
Section I1 summarizes research on commercial bank  behavior  in 
the municipal bond  market and  section I11 discusses the 
specification of  the model.  Section 1V presents the model,  and 
section V  describes the data. Section VI describes the econometric 
procedure and results. Section VII  concludes. 
11.  Related Research 
A.  Relative Yields 
Most  research on  the municipal bond  market  has focused on  the 
determinants of  the relative yields between  tax-exempt and  taxable 
debt.  In theory,  the tax-exempt yield divided by  the comparable 
taxable yield should equal 1 minus  the effective marginal  tax rate. 
However,  the mechanism  that would  ensure  this has been an object of 
much  research.  According  to the  "bank  arbitrage" hypothesis,  the 
www.clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmrelevant mechanism  is the buying and  selling of municipal  debt by 
commercial banks.  Banks  were  the relevant buyers  of municipal debt, 
since they could deduct a portion of  their interest expense 
attributable to carrying municipal  debt. 
In Miller  (1977),  the distribution of  net wealth among 
investors in different tax brackets determines the aggregate 
corporate debt-to-equity ratio and  the effective marginal  tax rates 
for corporate debt and  equity.  The  yield on municipal debt must  be 
such that all investors  (other than those who  prefer corporate debt) 
are indifferent between  equity and  municipal debt.  As Poterba 
(1989)  has pointed out, Miller  (1977)  implies that changes  in 
personal  tax rates should affect relative yields while  "bank 
arbitrage" implies that there should be  no  effect.  Poterba presents 
evidence  that personal tax changes  influence relative yields so that 
an exclusive focus on bank  demand  is indefensible in a study 
attempting to explain relative yields (see also Fortune  [1988]). 
B.  Banks  and Taxes 
Kimball  (1977)  describes the influence of  the tax code  on 
commercial bank demand  for municipal  securities (munis).  From 
studying the 1972-1975 period, Kimball  concludes that large banks 
relied more  on non-tax-exempt shelters than small banks,  for whom 
tax-exempts were  the principal source of  after-tax income.  As a 
result, the corporate tax rate change  in 1975 appeared to have had a 
larger impact  on small banks.  Leasing and  foreign tax credits in 
particular were  shelters dominated by  the larger banks.  Neubig  and 
Sullivan (1987b)  find size to be  significant when  entered as a proxy 
for tax shields.  However,  in their simulation study, Gelfand and 
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banks to TRA. 
The principal determinant of banks' holdings of municipal bonds 
seemed to be total income that could not be sheltered with 
deductions and credits (see Hendershott and Koch [1980]).  This 
seemed consistent with other studies,  which concluded that banks 
paid much less in taxes than nonfinancial institutions.  It seemed 
that banks could drive tax payments toward zero by purchasing 
taxable investments to exhaust credits and deductions, then 
investing the remaining available funds in tax-exempts.  Possibly in 
response to  these conclusions and to the difficulty in enforcing IRC  . 
Section 265 (which limited deduction of interest expense),  TRA 
removed banks' ability to deduct a portion of the interest expense 
attributable to carrying municipal bonds. 
C. TRA's  Impact on Banks 
TRA's impact on banksf  holdings of munis involves more than 
just the removal of interest deductibility for the bulk of municipal 
bonds.  By changing the tax provisions regarding the treatments of 
loan loss reserves, the alternative minimum tax, investment tax 
credit, foreign tax credits, and the statutory tax rate,  TRA 
influenced banksf  calculations of the amount of taxable income that 
could be sheltered by means other than munis.  In effect, these 
changes alter the "break-even  yield ratio" with which banks must 
compare actual relative yields.  In  addition, relative yields have 
moved significantly  since TRA. 
Both Neubig and Sullivan (1987a, 1987b) and Gelfand and O'Brien 
(1987) conclude that the recapture of bad debt reserves under TRA 
www.clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmwill be the most significant impact of TEU on after-tax  profits of 
commercial banks.  Prior to TEU,  under rules determined by Congress, 
banks could deduct increases in allowable bad debt reserves. 
Post-TRA,  banks with assets over $500 million can deduct charge-offs 
net of recoveries but will also have to recapture existing loan 
loss reserves into taxable income, generally over a four-year 
period. 
The calculation of the alternative minimum tax also affects 
muni demand, since the alternative tax rate has been increased from 
15 percent to 20 percent and the base has been expanded.  Half of 
reported book income over the alternative mimimum tax is now 
included as a preference item.  O'Brien and Gelfand conclude that, 
for banks subject to the alternative minimum tax, "tax-exempt" 
income will be taxed at an effective 10 percent rate. 
The repeal of the investment tax credit, effective January 1, 
1986,  and the reduction in the tax shield provided by leasing and 
depreciation would be expected to decrease the value of such 
activities to banks.  In addition,  TRA has reduced the value of 
foreign tax credits by restricting the extent to which foreign tax 
credits from different countries can be pooled against U.S.  tax 
liabilities. 
Both Gelfand-O'Brien  and Neubig-Sullivan  point out that 
relative yields are not likely to make the purchase of new munis 
attractive to banks.  The only exception may be "qualified-new 
issues,"  which retain a 20 percent disallowance.  However,  such 
issues are limited to issuers who expect to issue less than $10 
million in one year. 
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Kidwell,  Koch, and Stock (1987) have documented regional yield 
differentials in the municipal securities market.  The existence of 
state pledging requirements  was one factor explaining the 
differentials.  A variety of regulations have governed financial 
relations between state and local governments and financial 
institutions.  General revenues of state and local governments often 
must be deposited in banks within the same state.  Banks must then 
hold municipal securities of the same state as collateral against a 
portion of such deposits.  The required ratio between the collateral 
and the deposits varies from state to state.  In addition, the 
requirements for state funds may differ from the requirements for 
funds of political subdivisions;  the requirements may be different 
for "problem"  banks; the requirements may differ for banks with 
deposits exceeding a specified proportion of capital; banks within a 
state may be allowed to pool assets pledged as collateral; or banks 
may have to hold collateral against all deposits of the state, not 
just the uninsured portion. 
2 
Apparently in response to research showing that such 
regulations were reflected in the costs of state and local finance, 
the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations (1977) 
recommended that states reduce pledging requirements.  It is unclear 
if the impact of such requirements on the municipal bond market has 
diminished.  One of the rationales for increasing the federal 
deposit insurance ceiling from $20,000 to $40,000 was to reduce 
effective pledging requirments. 
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states.  More  than just  the rate schedules vary.  There  may  be 
differences in  whether  the federal tax base is utilized, whether 
there is a minimum  tax rule, whether  there is a different rate for 
financial institutions, or whether  there is a tax on  total capital 
or assets.3 Forbes  and Leonard  (1984)  concluded  that state tax 
differentials were  significant determinants of yield differentials. 
E.  Timing of Capital Loss  Realization 
Since capital gains and losses also influence taxable income, 
factors that influence realization independently of gross purchases 
may  influence the net change  in the muni  portfolio.  Although  it is 
clearly possible for a bank  to realize gains or losses and  to keep  - 
muni  holdings constant with new  purchases,  the new  bonds  may  not 
bring the same  tax benefits as the old bonds.  Neubig  and  Sullivan 
(1987b)  attempt to take account of  the maturity structure of  the 
existing muni  portfolios  in their analysis of  the impact  of  TRA. 
However,  while  information about maturity would  be valuable in 
determining the maximum  loss or gains  that could be  realized, it is 
unclear whether  there are factors that influence loss realization 
that are not incorporated into relative yields.  In fact, Heaton 
(1986)  shows  how  the relative yield on municipal bonds  is influenced 
by  the associated value of  tax deductions,  and Constantinides  and 
Ingersoll  (1984)  explicitly model  the influence of tax-timing 
options on  the equilibrium prices of  bonds,  such as municipals. 
Constantinides and  Ingersoll  (1984)  conclude that "...the main 
difference between  the optimal  trading policies for municipal  and 
www.clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmtaxable bonds is that no (municipal  bond) trades are ever made at a 
4  price above par.  . .  "  (p.  334).  However,  when municipals are at  a- 
deep discount, their tax-timing  options are roughly equal to those 
on taxable instruments.  In  addition, tax timing options,  which 
should be reflected in relative yields, also vary with tax rates on 
coupons and capital gains or losses. 
F.  Simultaneity with Loan-Loss Provisions 
The net income earned on municipals is only one component of 
net income.  Over our sample period, provision for loan loss has had 
a significant influence on net income.  Greenwalt and Sinkey (1988), 
in a study of  bank holding companies from 1976 to 1984, find 
evidence that loan loss provisions were made in  a manner consistent 
with the income-smoothing  hypothesis.  In addition,  TRA affected net 
income by requiring large banks to recapture outstanding loan loss 
reserves. While there are other influences on  net income,  these 
factors suggest that we consider the choices of  municipal bond 
holdings as made simultaneously  with loan loss provisions.  5 
111. Specification  of the Estimating Equations: Issues 
Previous analyses of bank demand for municipal securities 
emphasized the role of expected income and tax shields.  Neubig and 
Sullivan (1987b) develop in detail the banks' portfolio decision 
under the certainty case.  For banks that face the regular tax, the 
relative yield between tax-exempt  and taxable securities (ry) must 
be compared to the break-even  ratio (byr), which is calculated as 
(1)  1 -  u[l-b(id/it)],  where 
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=  interest expense/assets, 
b  =  percentage interest expense disallowance, 
u  =  marginal corporate tax rate, and 
i  =  interest rate on taxable investments. 
t 
If the relative yield exceeds the byr, the optimal 
share of assets held in municipals is calculated as 
(2)  MAX(  0, 1-[i (1-afb)-noif+(c/u)]/it  1,  where  d 
af  =  percent of total assets subject to interest expense 
disallowance, 
noif  =  net taxable noninterest income/assets, and 
c  =  tax credits/assets. 
Equation (2)  is consistent with the insight of  Kimball (1977). 
Muni demand is positively related to taxable investment returns,  net 
non-interest  income, corporate marginal tax rates, and the 
disallowance rate (as'long  as a higher disallowance rate does not 
increase the byr above the relative yield).  Demand is negatively 
related to interest expense rates and available tax credits. 
Several problems arise in applying this framework.  First, the 
appropriate yield calculation  is more complex during our sample 
period.  Second, in constructing our measure of income,  we need to 
consider the possibility that the demand for munis occurs' 
simultaneously with other portfolio choices.  Third, lack of 
suitable tax information prevents us from calculating satisfactory 
measures of ex-ante  effective tax rates,  deductions, and credits. 
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the introduction of  the new  alternative minimum  tax (arnt), which 
alters the byr calculation.  Determining ex-ante which  banks  will 
face the amt  is influenced by  the fact that the probability of 
facing the amt  is influenced by  municipal holdings,  since tax-exempt 
income  enters the amt  calculation.  Banks  that do  face the amt  would 
be  expected  to hold fewer  municipals,  since their greater tax 
liability would  be  matched with  taxable  income. 
In the case presented above,  there would  appear  to be no  role 
for relative yields to influence muni  demand  if the byr exceeded  the 
yield ratio.  However,  with uncertainty about  tax rates, deductions, 
or credits, banks  may  still purchase  munis  even  if the relative 
yield lies below  the byr. On  the other hand,  Hendershott  and Koch 
(1980)  claim that as long as relative yields are high enough, 
variation in relative yields is not  likely to influence demand.  If 
TRA  increased byrs enough  that bank  purchases of  munis  are no  longer 
justified,  variation in the difference between  the relative yield 
and  the byr can only influence muni  holdings by  influencing 
decisions about  realization of  capital gains or losses. 
Over  our sample period, relative yields rose  in part because 
TRA  decreased bank  demand  for munis  by  increasing the break-even 
ratio.  The  declining bank  demand  for munis  influenced prices and 
thus yields.  However,  banks  clearly increased their muni  purchases 
at the end of  1985  in order to grandfather  the partial interest 
deductibility. 
Our  measure  of  expected  taxable  income  can be obtained as a 
function of  lagged income  (Hendershott  and  Koch  [1980]) or 
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income measure from net after-tax  income and appropriate 
balance-sheet  components. Limited information about taxes, 
deductions,  and credits appears on the call reports. Previous 
research has included size as proxy for reliance on non-debt  tax 
shields. Large banks may be more likely to utilize tax shields such 
as investment tax credits,  depreciation deductions,  foreign tax 
credits,  and leasing. 
IV. The Econometric Model 
The model we use to analyze the behavior of commercial bank 
holdings of municipal securities from December 1984 to December 1988 
uses the following equations: 
(3) BVMt =  BVMt-l  +  P  t-  Rt; 
(4) P  =  P [  MAX(  O,gti  1, MAX(  0,ry-byr  ), State and  Local 
Deposits ]  +  e , 
P 
(5) R  = R [  MAX(  0,gti  1,  State and Local Deposits,  Unrealized 
Capital Losses on Municipals, Other Unrealized Losses, 
Loan Losses Provisons ] +  e  r  ' 
(6) LLP =  L [  MAX(  0,gti  ), Capital to Asset Ratio (excluding Loan 
Loss Reserve), Nonaccruing and Past-Due  Loans,  Net 
Charge-Offs,  Loan Loss Reserve] +  e  1  ' 
where BVM = book value of municipal securities, 
P  - purchases of municipal securities, 
R  =  sales of municipal securities, 
LLP = provision for loan losses,  and 
www.clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmgti =  "grossed-up  taxable income" as described below; e  e 
p'  r' 
and e  are disturbances.  1 
Implicit in this model is a distinction  between factors that 
determine purchases of munis (equation [4]) and those factors that 
influence sales (equation [5]). Previous analyses of muni holdings 
suggest that the purchases are influenced by income and relative 
yields.  We include state and local demand deposits as a proxy for 
state pledging requirements.  Our formulation  of the relative yield 
term removes the influence of variation in the difference between 
relative yields and the byr on purchases when that difference is 
negative.  This forces  variation in relative yields to influence 
muni holdings through changes in the market value of the existing 
securities portfolio (equation [5]). 
The realization of losses or gains influences net income. 
In equation (5),  we distinguish between losses that could be 
realized on munis and those that could be realized on other 
securities.  The level of state and local deposits would be expected 
to restrict the ability of banks to sell munis.  The amount of 
taxable income that could be sheltered with various deductions 
should be expected to be positively related to loss realization  and 
loan loss provisions, which are a deduction for book income 
7  purposes. 
As an alternative to the assumption imposed in equations (4) 
and (5), which states that the factors influencing sales are 
different from those influencing purchases,  we consider the 
following version of those equations. 
8 
www.clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfm(4A)  P =  [  MAX  (  0,gti ), ry-byr,  State and  Local Deposits] +  e  , 
P 
(5A)  R  =  [  MAX  (  0,gti ), ry-byr,  State and Local Deposits, 
Loan  Loss  Provisions  ]  +  e  .  r 
Equation  (6) states that loan loss provisions,  which  reduce net 
income,  are influenced by  taxable income  and factors describing the 
loan portfolio of  the bank.  The  factors that influence  loan loss 
provisions  are closely related to those that influence the addition 
to the loan loss reserve, a  component  of  the primary 
capital-to-asset ratio.  The  higher the loss reserve or the primary 
ratio, the less need  there is to add  to the reserve. On  the other 
hand,  the higher the inventory of  "bad loans" that need  to be 
charged off, the more  likely the bank  will provide for losses. 
Implicit in the model  is a  switch between  regimes.  The 
old regime  is one  in which  relative yields and  income  determined 
muni  holdings.  The  second regime  is one  in which  relative yields 
are not high enough  to justify muni  holdings, and,  given the level 
already purchased,'the change  in the level is determined by  factors 
such as loan loss provisions, unrealized losses on  other securities, 
book  losses on munis,  and  income  that the bank  has available to 
absorb capital losses. 
Unfortunately,  there is no  distinct shift between  regimes, 
since TRA  was  anticipated well before it became  effective.  This is 
evident in the runup  in bank  portfolios of munis  in 1985.  This also 
implies that factors determining the realization of  capital losses 
may  explain muni  purchases prior to TRA.  In addition,  since 
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banks, purchases may occur even if aggregate relative yields are 
inadequate. 
We specify a two-equation  model with the net change in the muni 
holdings and loan loss provisions as the simultaneous variables. To 
distinguish factors that should influence the level of  munis from 
those that should influence the change in the level,  we 
first-difference  the former and the dependent variable. We also 
specify an  alternative version of this system, derived from (4A) and 
(5A) . 
(7)  (1-L)BVMt =  am +  bml  *(I-L)MAX[O,ry-byrIt +  bm2  *(l-L)MAX[O,gti] 
+
  bm3  *(l-L)State  and Local Depositst 
+  bm4*(1-L)Unrealized  Losses (except  munis)  t 
+  bm5*Unrealized Losses on Munis  t-1 
+  bm6*Loan Loss Provisions  +  u  t  mt  ' 
(8) Loan Loss Provisions  t 
= al + bll*MAXIO,gtil 
+  b12*Primary  Capital (except LLR)  t-1 
+  b13*(Nonaccruing+Past  Due Loans)  t-1 
+  b14*Net  Charge-Off~~~~ 
+  b15*Loan  Loss Reserve(LLR)  +  e  t-1  It' 
L is the first-difference  operator.  All variables except 
(1-L)MAX[O,ry-byrIt  are scaled by consolidated bank assets at the 
beginning of the period (dated t-1) 
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We  choose  all  banks  reporting on  all call reports  from  December 
1984 to December  1988.  Omitting banks  with suspicious data leaves us 
with  12,035 banks.  Utilizing the June  and December  call reports and 
first differencing leaves us with eight observations for each bank. 
The  variable gti, grossed-up taxable  income,  is calculated 
starting from  end-of-period income  before taxes and extraordinary 
items.  To  this we  add  1) an estimate of  the amount  by  which  income 
would  have been higher with  tax-exempt  income  inflated to a taxable 
level (the total of  all tax-exempt  income  items  [securities, loans, 
and  leases] was  multiplied by  [(l/ry)-11, where  ry is described 
below),  2)  the loan loss provision,  3)  realized capital gains and 
losses on  the securities account, 4)  the non-deductible  portion of 
interest expense  associated with munis,  5)  net charge-offs, and 6) 
the required recapture of bad-debt reserves by  large banks. 
All  banks with at least $500  million in total assets at the end 
of  1986  recapture at least 10 percent of  the December  1986  loan loss 
reserve into 1987  income,  with equal portions  in each half of  the 
year.  If recapture of  10 percent  still leaves the bank with gti 
below  0 for the year as a whole,  then the bank  recaptures enough  to 
reach 0, if the loan loss reserve is sufficient.  All  banks  that 
recapture  in 1987  recapture 2/9  of  the remainder  in 1988  income.  A 
bank  that isn't large enough  at the end of  1986 may  be  large enough 
at the end of  1987. 
The  variable ry is measured  as the ratio between  10-year munis 
and Treasury bonds.  The  variable byr,  the break-even ratio, is 
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tax rate, the disallowance ratio (which increased from  .20 to 1.0 
after August  7, 1986  for "non-qualified bonds"),  interest 
expense/total  assets as reported by  the bank,  and  the 10-year 
Treasury rate. 
For  state and local deposits, we  use demand  deposits of  the 
states and political subdivisions  rather than the broader  measures 
of  total transaction deposits, or total deposits, both of which  are 
available. Unrealized  losses on  munis  are calculated from  the 
securities accounts  (only banks  with assets above  $1 billion report 
any  detail on their trading account portfolios) as book  value minus 
market  value at the end  of  the previous period.  Other unrealized 
losses are calculated from  the remainder  of  book  and market value on 
the securities accounts. 
VI.  Estimation Procedure and Results: 
Since loan loss provisions  influence muni  holdings but muni 
holdings do  not appear on  the right-hand side of  the equation for 
loan loss provisions, we  utilize a simple two-stage  procedure. 
First we  estimate the equation for loan loss provisions,  then the 
equation for munis  with the predicted value for loan loss provisions 
on the right-hand side. 
We  estimate the second  equation first as a panel,  considering 
the possibility that the error term,  u  has  the following error  mt' 
components  structure: 
-  (9)  umit  - fmi 
+
  gmt 
+
  hmit' 
f  and  gmt  are the bank  and  time  error components,  respectively. 
mi 
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to estimate the variance components, and then perform estimated 
generalized least squares.'  We then estimate the second equation for 
each call report separately and for all reports together,  We test 
for the equality of coefficients across time for both the first and 
second equation.  The results for the first equation lead us to 
generate the predicted value for loan loss provisions from each call 
report separately. 
Table I presents the results for the equation for loan loss 
provisions.  As we would expect,  higher levels of taxable income are 
associated with higher loan loss provisions, since provisions reduce 
book after-tax  income.  This is also consistent with Greenwalt and 
Sinkey (1988), who found that provisions were utilized to smooth 
income.  Although the capital-to-asset  ratio (which excludes loan 
loss reserves) is significant in all but one period, its sign 
changes. We expected that higher levels of this variable would imply 
less need to add to the loan loss reserve so as to meet primary 
capital guidelines and, thus,  there would be less need to provide 
for loan losses.  The nonaccruing and past-due  loans and net 
charge-offs  variables are positive and significant in all periods. 
Nonaccruing loans is a measure of the amount of loans that are 
likely candidates for charge-offs. Net charge-offs  are closely 
related to the bad debt reserve tax deduction, differing from the 
deduction by the amount by which allowable reserves change.  The 
last column of Table I presents the results from pooling all the 
www.clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmperiods.  A Chow test leads us to reject the restriction.  We 
generate the predicted value of loan loss provisions for the second 
stage from each report separately. 
Table I1 presents the results from the panel data estimation of 
the second equation,  both with and without a size variable.  Income, 
loan loss provisions, and state and local deposits have the expected 
signs and neither type of unrealized losses are significant 
influences.  These results are not sensitive to the inclusion of 
size.  However, the inclusion of size reduces the magnitude of the 
coefficients on income,  provisions,  and deposits.  If large banks 
had greater availability to non-debt  tax shields,  we would expect 
the inclusion of size to reduce the positive coefficient on income. 
If large banks placed less reliance on state and local deposits, 
including size would increase the positive coefficient on our proxy 
for pledging requirements.  As a proxy for non-debt  tax shields, 
size should have a negative coefficient,  not a positive coefficient. 
Including size also implies that relative yields have not been 
significant influences on muni holdings. 
Table I1 also indicates that there is no cross-sectional 
component to the composite error term,  u  mit  '  lo  This suggests that 
we calculate the "between"  estimator for each report separately. 
These results are presented in the remaining tables.  In  Tables IIIA 
and IIIB,  we reestimate the second equation for each report with and 
without a size variable,  respectively. 
In general,  only the coefficient on taxable income has the 
expected sign (positive) in all periods,  with or without inclusion 
www.clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmof size. When included,  size is a consistently positive influence on 
muni holdings. State and local deposits are a positive influence 
except in the first half of 1985 and the last half of 1988. While 
significant in almost all cases, the direction of influence of loan 
loss provisions and relative yields varies.  However, unlike the 
results detailed in Table 11,  the coefficients on  unrealized losses 
are sometimes significant.  Our specification  implied that 
unrealized losses might matter after TEU,  when relative yields would 
fall below break-even  ratios.  Then, the inventory of unrealized 
losses on  munis would be positively related to sales (negatively 
related to muni levels).  A substitute deduction, unrealized losses 
on other securities, would be a positive influence. Tables IIIA and 
IIIB indicate that unrealized losses on munis are generally a 
positive influence after TEU but were a negative influence in 1985. 
Other unrealized losses are sometimes a significant influence.  The 
last column of each table indicates the results from pooling all 
periods,  with predicted loan loss provisions coming from pooling all 
periods as well.  Again.we  would reject the restriction that the 
coefficient vectors are equal across reports. 
In Tables IVA and IVB we present the results from estimating 
the alternative model in which we have excluded the unrealized loss 
variables and replaced MAX  (0,  ry-byr)  with ry -  byr. The results 
are similar to those depicted in Tables IIIA and IIIB.  Only the 
coefficient on income is consistently of the expected sign.  Size 
consistently has a positive influence.  Although we have excluded 
www.clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmthe unrealized loss variables,  which might be affected by movements 
in market yields, the coefficient on rel-ative yields is often 
negative and significant. 
The last columns of Tables IVA and IVB are the estimates made 
when all reports are stacked together.  Again, the restrictions that 
the coefficients be equal across periods are rejected. However, if 
we compare the last columns of Tables IIIA and IVA and the last 
columns of Tables IIIB and IVB,  the implications of the two 
alternative models for the influences of income, yields, deposits, 
and size seem similar. 
VII.Conclusion and Possible Extensions 
This paper has attempted to extend the analysis of bank demand 
for municipal securities to consider the influence of state pledging 
requirements, factors that could determine the sell-off  of munis 
when relative yields do not generally justify new purchases, and 
simultaneity with loan loss provisions.  Implicit in our analysis 
was a hypothesis that relative yields and income as determinants of 
muni demand declined in importance with the passage of the Tax 
Reform Act of 1986 and that factors influencing loss realization and 
loan-loss  provision increased in importance. 
We feel that the results regarding the significance of state 
pledging requirements warrant further investigation,  especially in 
light of recent controversies about the differential impact of TRA 
on state and local finance. In addition, provisions for loan losses 
and unrealized securities losses are sometimes significant 
determinants of muni holdings. However, the influence of relative 
www.clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmyields,  which were sometimes negatively related to muni holdings, is 
hard to reconcile with our model or with other models of muni 
demand. 
In further work, the influence of state pledging requirements 
or other state regulations could be explored,  given the detail 
provided by the Advisory Council on Intergovernmental Relations 
(1989) or the Conference of State Bank Supervisors.  The analysis of 
the influence of loss-realization  timing could be explored, 
utilizing information on the trading accounts of large banks. 
However, this avenue is limited by the paucity of data on the 
maturities of bank securities.  Finally, the econometric procedure 
could be designed to more explicitly take advantage of the 
simultaneity between loan loss provisions and muni holdings in a 
panel framework. 
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First Stage Estimates: 
Dependent Variable: Loan Loss Provisions /Total Assets  t  t-1 
Variable 
Constant 
Capital-to-Asset  0.0001  0.005  -0.002  0.013 
Ratio  t-1  (.001)  (.OOl)**  (.OOl)*  (.OOl)** 
Nonaccruing and Past-  0.050  0.081  0.055  0.106 
Due Loans  t-1  (.002)**  (.003)**  (.002)**  (.003)** 
Net Charge-Off~~-~  0.700  0.6.15  0.276  0.505 
(.014)**  (.012)**  (.008)**  (.013)** 
Loan-Loss  Reserve  t-1 
- .lo1  -0.09  0.070  -0.036 
(.Oil)** (.014)**  (.012)**  (.015)** 
SSE 
2  R (adjusted) 
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First Stage Estimates: 
Dependent Variable: Loan Loss Provisions /Total Assets 
t  t-1 
Variable 
Constant  0.0004  0.0004  0.0004  -0.0011  0.0001 
(.0001)**(.0002)**(.0001)**(.0002)**(.0001)* 
Capital-Asset  -0.002  0.003  - .0004  0.006  0.002 
Ratio  t-1  (.001)  (.OOl)**  (.0009)  (.002)**(.0004)** 
Nonaccruing and  0.061  0.098  0.058  0.099  0.086 
Past Due Loans  (.002)**  (.003)**  (.002)**  (.004)**  (.OOl)**  t-1 
Charge Of  fs -  0.128  0.598  0.309  0.670  0.371 
(.007)**  (.013)**  (.008)**  (.015)**  (.004)** 
Loss Reserve  t-1  0.057  -0.137  -.048  -0.032  -0.030 
(.010)**  (.010)**  (.007)**  (.012)**  (.004)** 
SSE  0.293  0.423  0.205  0.638  3.628 
2  R (adjusted)  0.187  0.385  0.284  0.361  0.286 
Number of observations: 12,035. 
*  :significant  at .lo. 
** :  significant  'at .05. 
Note: All variables are scaled by lagged total assets. 
Source: Author's calculations. 
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Time Series/Cross-Sectional Estimates of the Equation for 
Municipal Securities 
Dependent Variable: (BVM -BVMt-l)/Total  Assets  t  t-1 
With Size  Without Size 
Variable 
Constant 
Unrealized 
Muni Losses  t-1 
Loan Loss 
Provisions  t  (from 1st stage) 
State and Local  0.1766 
Deposits  ( .0065)**  t 
Other Unrealized  0.0131 
Losses  t 
( .0105) 
ln(Tota1  Assets )  t  0.0573 
( .0008)  ** 
Error Components 
Cross-Sectional  0.000000  0.000000 
Time Series  0.000025  0.000026 
Error  0.000652  0.000691 
MSE of Transformed 
Regression  0.000638  0.000674 
Degrees of Freedom  96,272  96,273 
*  :significant  at .lo. 
**:significant  at .05. 
All variables other than (1-L)MAX( 0,  ry-byr )t, and 
(1-L)ln  (Total Assets) are divided by lagged Total Assets. 
Source: Author's calculations. 
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Second Stage Estimates of the Equation for 
Municipal Securities 
Dependent Variable: (BVMt-BVMt-l)/Total  Assets  t-1 
(Without Size as an Independent Variable) 
Variable 
Constant 
Unrealized  -0.355  -0.614  -0.318  -0.012 
Muni Losses  t-1  (.036)**  (.067)**  (.078)**  (.036) 
Loan Loss  -0.901  -1.37  2.078  -0.182 
Provisions  t  (.072)**  (.067)**  (.122)**  (.039)%* 
(from 1st stage) 
State and Local  0.00007  0.120  0.556  0.056 
Deposits  t  (.018)  (.019)**  (.022)**  (.014)** 
Other Unrealized  - 0.024  -0.021  -0.447  -0.029 
Losses  t  (.028)  (.038)  (.040)**  (.018) 
SSE  7.35  11.93  18.44  4.51 
2  R (adjusted)  0.027  0.048  0.315  0.051 
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Second Stage Estimates of  the Equation for 
Municipal Securities 
Dependent  Variable:  (BVM  -BVMt-l)/Total  Assets 
t  t-1 
(Without Size as an Independent Variable) 
Variable 
Constant  -0.007  -0.0003  -0.003  -0.002  -0.0015 
(.0006)**(.0002)**(.0002)**(.0001)**(.0001)** 
Unrealized  0.021  0.346  0.251  0.414  -0.050 
Muni  Losses  t-1  (.035)  (.034)**  (.050)**  (.035)**  (.017)** 
Loan  Loss  2.039**  -0.058  0.626  -0.078  0.237 
Provisions 
t  (.094)  (.036)  (.070)**  (.023)**  (.025)** 
State and  Local  0.290  0.067  0.247  -0.005  0.242 
Deposits 
t  (02)  (04)  (.07)**  (00)  (.007)** 
Other Unrealized 0.203  -0.006  0.114  0.080  -0.0002 
Losses 
t  (.023)**  (.023)  (.033)**  (.021)**  (.011) 
SSE  6.38  3.06  4.23  1.76  67.07 
2  R  (adjusted)  0.618  0.058  0.097  0.030  0.168 
Number  of observations: 12,035. 
*  :significant at .lo. 
**:significant  at .05. 
Note:  All variables other than  (1-L)MAX(  0, ry-byr  )t  are 
divided by  lagged Total Assets. 
Source:  Author's  calculations. 
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Second Stage Estimates of the Equation for 
Municipal Securities 
Dependent Variable: (BVM -BVMt-l)/Total  Assets 
t  t-1 
(With Size as an Independent Variable) 
Variable 
Constant 
Unrealized  -0.291  -0.558  0.134  -0.007 
Muni Losses  t-1  (.035)**  (.059)**  (.072)*  (.036) 
Loan Loss  -0.680  -1.190  2.489  -0.102 
Provisions  t  (.070)**  .067** 4)**  (.039)** 
(from 1st stage) 
State and Local  -0.042  0.043  0.397  0.022 
Deposits  t  (.018)**  (.019)**  (.021)**  (.014) 
Other Unrealized  -0.020  0.029  -0.359  -0.024 
Losses  t  (.027)  (.038)  (.037)**  (.018) 
ln(Tota1  Assets )  .  t  0.049  0.053  0.155  0.036 
(.002)**  (.003)**  (.004)**  (.002)** 
SSE 
2  R (adjusted) 
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Second Stage Estimates of the Equation for 
Municipal Securities 
Dependent Variable: (BVM -BVMt-l)/Total Assets  t  t  - 1 
(With Size as an Independent Variable) 
Variable 
Constant  -0.008  -0.004  -0.004  -0.003  -0.004 
(.0005)**(.0002)**(.0002)**(.0001)**(.0001)** 
Unrealized  0.062  0.366  0.277  0.418  - .023 
Muni Losses  t-1  (.034)*  (.033)**  (.047)**  (.034)**  (.016) 
Loan Loss  2.177  0.137  0.608  -0.024  0.409 
Provisions  t  (.090)**  (.035)**  (.002)**  (.023)  (.024)** 
(1-L)*. . 
MAX(0,  ry-byr)  -0.006  0.087  -0.021  -0.059  0.028 
(.006)  (.017)**(.025)  (.038)  (.OOl)** 
State and Local  0.205  0.027  0.158  -0.023  0,170 
Deposits  t  (.020)**  (.014)*  (.016)**  (.010)**  (.007)** 
Other Unrealized 0.211  -0.006  0.056  0.054  0.018 
Losses  t  (.022)**  (.022)  (.032)*  (.020)**  (.010)* 
SSE  5.90  2.88  3.75  1.69  63.12 
2  R (adjusted)  0.647  0.112  0.199  0.072  0.217 
Number of observations: 12,035. 
*  :significant  at .lo. 
**:significant at .05. 
Note: All variables other than (1-L)MAX{ 0,  ry-byr )  ,  and 
(1  -L)lnTotal Assets are divided by lagged Total ~sseEs. 
Source: Author's calculations. 
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Second Stage Estimates of the Equation for 
Municipal Securities 
Dependent Variable: (BVM -BVMt-l)/Total  Assets  t  t-1 
(Without Size as an Independent Variable) 
(Without Unrealized Capital Losses as Independent Variables) 
6/85  12/85  6/86  12/86 
Variable 
Constant 
Loan Loss 
Provisions  t  (from 1st stage) 
State and Local 
Deposits  t 
SSE 
2  R (adjusted) 
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Second Stage Estimates of the Equation for 
Municipal Securities 
Dependent Variable: (BVMt-BVMt-l)/T~tal  Assets  t-1 
(Without Size as an Independent  Variable) 
(Without Unrealized Capital Losses as Independent Variables) 
Variable 
Constant 
Loan Loss 
Provisions  t 
(1-L)*. . 
State and Local  0.293  0.066  0.250  -0.006  0.241 
Deposits  t  .  04*  (.07)**  (00)  (.025)** 
SSE  6.43  3.09  4.25  1.79  67.09 
2  R (adjusted)  0.615  0.050  0.094  0.017  0.168 
Number of observations: 12,035. 
*  :significant  at .lo. 
**:significant at .05. 
Note: All variables other than (1-L)(ry-byr)  are divided by  t 
lagged Total Assets. 
Source: Author's  calculations. 
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Second Stage Estimates of the Equation for 
Municipal Securities 
Dependent Variable: (BVM -BVMt-l)/Total Assets 
t  t-1 
(With Size as an Independent  Variable) 
(Without Unrealized Capital Losses as Independent Variables) 
Variable 
Constant 
Loan Loss 
Provisions  t 
(from 1st stage) 
State and Local 
Deposits  t 
ln(Tota1  Assets )  t 
SSE 
2  R (adjusted) 
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Second Stage Estimates of the Equation for 
Municipal Securities 
Dependent Variable: (BVMt-BVMt-l)/Total  Assets  t-1 
(With Size as an Independent Variable) 
(Without  Unrealized Capital Losses as Independent  Variables) 
Variable 
Constant  -0.011  -0.006  -0.005  -0.004  -0.004 
(.0094)~~*(.0002)**(.0002)**(.0001)**(.0001)** 
Loan Loss  2.227  0.196  0.649  -0.004  0.408 
Provisions  t  (.088)**  (.035)**  (.066)**  (.022)  (.024)** 
State and Local  0.214  0.029  0.162  -0.024  0.170 
Deposits  t  (.020)**  (.014)**  (.016)**  (.OlO)**  (.007)** 
SSE  5.94  2.92  3.76  1.70  63.23 
2  R (adjusted)  0.644  0.102  0.197  0.065  0.215 
Number of observations: 12,035. 
*  :significant  at .lo. 
**:significant at  -05. 
Note: All variables other than (1-L)(ry-byr)  and (1-L)lnTotal  t' 
Assets are divided by lagged Total Assets. 
Source: Author's calculations. 
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1) Property and casualty insurance companies essentially 
deducted all of their interest expense via the reserve 
deduction until 1986.  Non-financial  corporations can deduct 
all interest expense as long as tax-exempts  constitute no more 
than 2 percent of total assets. 
2)  See A Profile of State Chartered Banking,  Council of State 
Bank Supervisors, 1988. 
3)  See Significant Facts About Fiscal Federalism,  Advisory 
Council on Intergovernmental  Relations,  Washington, D.C.,  1977. 
4) The essential difference between the two categories is that, 
for municipals, the amortization of the basis that occurs when 
the purchase price exceeds par is not a deduction from income. 
When municipals are at a deep discount and are being compared 
to equivalent taxables, the right to amortize the basis is of 
little value. 
5)  A  complication that arises at this point is that income 
smoothing may be more appropriately applied to analysis of  book 
income while muni holdings are more directly related to tax 
return income.  We deal with this when  we discuss our income 
measure,  which is constructed  with the call report (book) data. 
www.clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfm6) Neubig and Sullivan (1987) provide a detailed description of 
calculation of the byr relevant to a bank facing the amt. 
7) As we discuss in our calculation of taxable income, the 
equivalent deduction for tax purposes is the maxim&  allowable 
addition to the bad-debt  reserve. 
8) The first formulation implies other restrictions as well 
One is that variation in relative yields only influences 
purchases if ry -  byr is positive, ex-post. 
9) The actual calculations are done by the SAS routine TSCSREG. 
10) Actually, the estimated cross-sectional  variance component 
is negative, then set to zero in the estimated GLS procedure 
(EGLS).  Baltagi (1981) indicates that it is difficult in 
practice to distinguish between misspecification and actually 
having a zero variance component.  Baltagi also indicates that 
setting such components to zero in the EGLS procedure does not 
damage the performance of the estimation  procedure 
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